Nettet1. sep. 2011 · We study in the lab if contracts can solve the hold-up (underinvestment) problem. We consider investments by the seller that increase the buyerʼs valuation. Fixed-price contracts do not lead to more investments. Non-renegotiable option contracts solve the hold-up problem. Renegotiable option contracts acting as reference points still … Nettet1. jan. 2008 · Hold-up arises when part of the return on an agent’s relationship-specific investments is ex post expropriable by his trading partner. The hold-up problem has played an important role as a...
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NettetHold-up arises when part of the return on an agent's relationship-specific investments is ex post expropriable by his trading partner. The hold-up problem … eagles cheer song
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In economics, the hold-up problem is central to the theory of incomplete contracts, and shows the difficulty in writing complete contracts. A hold-up problem arises when two factors are present: Parties to a future transaction must make noncontractible relationship-specific investments before the … Se mer It is often argued that the possibility of a hold-up can lead to underinvestment in relation-specific investment and thus inefficiency. Underinvestment occurs because investors cannot guarantee themselves a … Se mer Auto Industry A historic example concerns the US car industry, but the example is sharply disputed by Coase (2000). Fisher Body had an exclusive contract with General Motors (GM) to supply car body parts and so Fisher Body was the … Se mer • Specific asset • Vertical monopoly • Game theory Se mer In a scenario where two risk-neutral parties S (supplier) and B (Buyer) can make profit by working together, it is efficient to work together as long as the buyers' valuation exceeds the sellers' costs (Schmitz, 2001). When the two parties could agree … Se mer Contractual Rogerson (1992) showed the existence of a first-best contractual solution to the hold-up problem in even extremely complex environments involving x agents with arbitrarily complex transaction decisions and utility functions. … Se mer NettetThe hold-up problem has played an important role as a foundation of modern contract and organization theory, as the associated inefficiencies have justified many prominent … NettetHold-up heisst soviel wie „ausrauben” und ist ein Ausdruck, der im Principal-Agent-Ansatz (siehe auch Organisationstheorie) und im Transaktionskostenansatz ( Transaktionskostentheorie in der Organisationstheorie) Verwendung findet. eagle schedule football